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THE GAP BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA:
SERVING THE NEXT GENERATION OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS CASES
LEXIE WARD
INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 2017, the United States Supreme Court
announced a decision in Davis v. Davila, which bars substantial claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that have been procedurally
defaulted.1 However, despite the merits of limiting the number of cases which
were not diligently pursued by an inmate, the Court states its conclusion too
broadly and now effectively bars a prisoner from bringing claims of
significant trial error in front of any court. A prisoner’s claim that was not
available until a trial-level appeal, and was then avoided due to ineffective
post-conviction counsel, may now be dodged by a court on federal habeas
corpus, and a significant constitutional trial right may never be heard by a
United States Court.
Before a discussion of the gap present between two significant
landmark habeas corpus cases, Davila and Martinez v. Ryan, a few things are
important to note. It is important to understand the history of the federal
habeas corpus system, its constitutional foundations, its procedural
mechanisms, and how state courts come into the mix while still ensuring a
system of federalism is respected. A brief history of the federal habeas system
outlines its pre-constitutional roots derived from the English court system
and emphasizes the importance placed on the writ of habeas corpus by our
founding fathers, which led to the inclusion of the writ in the Constitution.
As part of the creation of a federal system of government, the importance of
states’ right to fully hear and exhaust state claims before a federal court may
review it emerged, promoting notions of supremacy and state sovereignty.
Further, the concept of a procedural default demonstrates that there
are some state claims that can never be brought in a federal court, based
solely on a prisoner’s failure to present a claim to a state court, serving the
notion of federalism. However, evolution of the writ of habeas corpus led the
Court to allow a petitioner to bring certain procedurally exhausted claims

1.

Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2065 (2017).
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after satisfying both that they have a cause for the procedural default, and
that actual prejudice has befallen them because of such omission.
Next, a trilogy of cases, culminating with the latest decision of
Davila, gives a thorough background of the federalism concerns addressed
in the realm of federal habeas corpus. These cases also establish when a
federal court may hear certain claims from a state prisoner, and when those
claims are procedurally barred from a federal appeal. Coleman v. Thompson
discusses the idea of allocating the costs of burdens between the state and the
prisoner depending on when counsel is constitutionally guaranteed.2 Then,
Martinez recognizes a finely narrow exception to the decision in Coleman,
that allows in the narrowest of circumstances, for a federal court to hear a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, when post-conviction counsel
was ineffective in failing to raise such a claim.3 And finally, the Davila
Court’s decision to reject an extension of the Martinez exception discusses
the difference in ineffective assistance claims of trial and appellate counsel,4
and inadvertently creates a gap that will result in significant trial errors
evading review from any court.
Finally, a look into the Davila decision, along with illustrative
examples found in Justice Breyer’s dissent, reveals a glaring gap between the
majority opinions in Martinez and Davila that ultimately calls for an equally
narrow exception, which extends the Martinez exception to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on stand-alone
constitutional errors.
I. ORIGINS AND IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
While at common law there existed six different types of writs of
habeas corpus, the modern “great writ” of habeas corpus, literally translated
to “let us have the body,” simply requires a person be brought forth before a
court.5 Once a prisoner is brought before a court by way of the writ, that court
may look into the legality of that prisoner’s confinement to either grant or
deny the requested relief of release.6 The use of the writ, however, to
physically bring a prisoner to court to challenge his confinement is not
necessary to grant a release based on a petition of habeas corpus, especially
when the constitutionality of confinement has been blatantly violated.7
The modern writ of habeas corpus is viewed as a shield to those
improperly imprisoned, but the origins of the writ were not as protective.8
The earliest use of the writ of habeas corpus was not to free individuals from
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991).
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012).
Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2066–68.
20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973).
Id.
Id.
Book Note, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1186 (1982) (reviewing WILLIAM F. DUKER, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980)).
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the judicial system, but rather to bring them within the court’s reach. 9
Originally, the writ was used to bring certain criminal offenders before the
king’s court, and was widely used to haul various people into court, whether
or not a serious crime was committed.10 During the fourteenth century, a shift
occurred where the Court of Chancery began to not only use the writ as a
court summons, but also to review the detention of prisoners, a reflection of
the modern writ.11
As time progressed, English political strife led to altered forms of the
writ used primarily for jurisdictional battles.12 The Chancellor of Parliament
and the King’s Bench, each claiming jurisdiction, would use the writ to
attempt to circumvent unfavorable decisions by the other.13 The Chancellor
would endeavor by way of injunction to block a prisoner from bringing a
claim to the King’s Bench.14 In return, the Crown would attempt to
implement the writ to free that very same prisoner.15 This original use of the
writ was not determined by a prisoner’s guilt or innocence; this use of the
writ was a power struggle over jurisdiction by the opposing forces of the
Chancellor and Crown.16 Eventually, the struggle between the two ceased as
Parliament successfully passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the
writ’s official use protected prisoners from arbitrary imprisonment by the
Crown.17
This clash of powers between Parliament and the Crown, both
attempting to use the writ for two different purposes, reflects our modern
clash between federal and state courts.18 Of course, with the United States’
original court system deeply rooted in the English system, recognition of the
writ of habeas corpus has been present in the states since the original
founding of the colonies.19 With the creation of the Constitution, and its
deliberate separation of state and federal governments, the First Congress and
the Framers were careful to draft the habeas clause in line with the notions of
state sovereignty, limiting Congress’s power to suspend state habeas for
federal prisoners.20
Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution guarantees that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
required in the interest of public safety.21 There are three types of federal
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id at 1186-87.
12. Id. at 1187.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1187-88.
19. Id. at 1188.
20. Id.
21. 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261
(3d. ed. 2017).
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habeas corpus remedies, but the two most common are found in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254 and 2255.22 Under § 2254 a state prisoner can challenge his state
court conviction or sentence in federal court based on constitutional
grounds.23 Section 2255 is the equivalent of § 2254, but offers federal
prisoners the chance to challenge their federal convictions or sentences. 24
Reform of these modern statutes used by practitioners today began as early
as the 18th century, and has involved great expansion, and then contraction,
of judicial power in implementing the writ.25
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted courts federal jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus, which originally only extended to federal prisoners.26
In 1867, Congress extended the authorization of courts to “grant the writ ‘in
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation
of the constitution [sic], or of any treaty or law of the United States.’”27 This
act of Congress effectively made the writ of habeas corpus not only available
to federal prisoners, but state prisoners as well.28
This expansive availability to both federal and state prisoners
brought on a series of phases in habeas corpus that drastically expanded
courts’ power in exercising the writ. Originally, a federal court’s
authorization to issue the writ of habeas corpus was limited to that in
accordance with the common law; federal court examination was limited to
determining the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.29 Further, the Supreme
Court declined to encroach on state court judgments of conviction.30 In Ex
parte Parks, the Court determined that where a sentencing court properly
held jurisdiction over a case, the writ could not lie.31 However, this decision
did not limit the established notions of supremacy; when a judgment was
unconstitutional on its face, the writ would lie.32
Gradually, the scope of review was expanded to assess what were
previously thought of as “unreviewable decisions involving fundamental
rights.”33 The Court began to hold that constitutional claims may be reviewed
on habeas corpus, relying on the theory that unconstitutional deprivations
necessarily stripped a trial court of jurisdiction.34 After the legislation
22. Brent E. Newton, A Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review,
CHAMPION, June 2005, at 16, 17.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261.
26. Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV.
557, 563–64 (1994).
27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261.
28. Id.
29. Margolis, supra note 26, at 564.
30. 39 AM. JUR. TRIALS Historical Aspects and Procedural Limitations of Federal
Habeas Corpus § 4 (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Margolis, supra note 26, at 564.
34. Id.
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extending the writ to state prisoners passed in 1867, this broad interpretation
of reviewing constitutional claims allowed for an expansive use of the writ
for any incarcerated person, whether held federally or by a state, when the
challenge was purely constitutional.35
Several landmark decisions by the Supreme Court progressively
produced the modern era of habeas corpus, when the Court expanded its use
to bring a state prisoner’s claim before federal courts. In Frank v. Mangum,
the Court indicated in dictum that if a state appellate court’s procedures were
found inadequate to fully consider a prisoner’s rights, the Court could
properly examine the merits of such a case.36 In Brown v. Allen, the Court
held that even when a state’s highest court has fully adjudicated a case, a
petitioner is entitled to full and fair consideration of his constitutional claims
on federal habeas corpus, and a federal court may consider both law and fact
on rehearing.37 By far, the most expansive and far-reaching expansion of
federal habeas relief came from the Court’s holding in Fay v. Noia that a
federal court may, and should, consider a constitutional claim on habeas
review even if a petitioner failed to fully exhaust state appellate procedures,
if at the time the issue was raised in a federal court state review options were
no longer available.38
In Fay v. Noia, a new test emerged to examine procedural defaults
of prisoner’s claims. In Fay, even though the petitioner was not said to have
committed a “deliberate bypass” of the state courts, the Court’s decision
created such a test to determine whether a procedural default had in fact
occurred to effectively bar a prisoner’s constitutional claim.39 The Court held
that a procedural default (a failure to raise a claim below in a state court that
would bar a federal court from subsequently hearing that same claim) would
not apply unless it could be shown that a prisoner had “deliberately
bypassed” a state court’s opportunity to hear the claim, by intentionally
failing to raise a constitutional issue until he or she could gain access to a
federal court through habeas corpus petition.40 Proving a deliberate bypass,
rather than an accidental omission, had occurred was left to the court to
decide, creating an unpredictable application of habeas corpus.41
This drastic expansion of the writ of habeas corpus continued
steadily until the 1976 decision in Stone v. Powell.42 In Stone, where two
prisoners were convicted based on evidence obtained through an illegal
search, the majority held that since the state court had fully and fairly litigated
the Fourth Amendment claim, a federal court may not hear it.43 Despite
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
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agreement amongst the Court that these two prisoners’ Fourth Amendment
rights had been severely violated, the Court determined that their
constitutional right to challenge such claims was exhausted once a state court
had fully litigated the issue.44 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion,
pointed out that this method of eliminating review of constitutional claims
by federal courts “effectively cast the district courts sitting in habeas in the
role of surrogate Supreme Courts.”45
Finally, along came the pivotal case Wainwright v. Sykes, putting a
much-desired end to the “deliberate bypass” test from Fay, and reigning in
the unfettered judicial power over petitions for federal habeas.46 Sykes
ushered in a new test that is still used in modern habeas cases today to assess
whether a procedural default has occurred, and whether a court may
nonetheless hear that procedurally defaulted claim.47 In Sykes, the Court
reduced the effects of Fay by limiting the basis on which a state prisoner can
bring a constitutional claim in his or her habeas petition if a state court has
already heard the issue.48 Sykes initially precludes habeas relief, unless a state
prisoner can demonstrate both a “cause” for his failure to assert a claim, or
to timely bring such claim in a lower state court, and “actual prejudice”
resulting from the alleged constitutional deprivation.49
Today, the most significant use of the statutes is issuance of the writ
when a prisoner is held in violation of the federal Constitution or federal
laws.50 A petitioner must satisfy the Sykes “cause and prejudice” standard to
overcome any procedural defaults.51 The Supreme Court has noted in past
cases that a failure to satisfy the “cause” prong is fatal to a petitioner’s case.52
What may satisfy the “cause” prong of the Sykes standard to allow a
petitioner to overcome a procedural default of a claim has evolved over the
years and, most pertinently to this note, is detailed by a trilogy of cases
discussed below: Coleman, Martinez, and Davila. However, before a
discussion of these pivotal cases, it is important to grasp the doctrines of
exhaustion and procedural exhaustion, and to appreciate the procedural
differences between the two concepts.

44. Id. at 568.
45. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511–12 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
46. Id. at 568–69.
47. Id. at 569.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 4261.
51. Margolis, supra note 26, at 569.
52. Id. at 570.
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II. JUDICIALLY-CREATED PROCEDURAL HURDLES: THE BASIC NOTIONS
OF EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

A. Exhaustion
The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus mandates full
and fair presentation of claims under § 2254 to all available levels of state
courts for review before presenting the exact same claim to a federal court,
which may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner
unless, with certain exceptions, the prisoner has exhausted all available state
remedies.53 “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged
violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact
that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States
Constitution.”54 The “mere similarity of [state and federal] claims” is
insufficient for fair presentation.55 A petitioner does not fairly present a
federal claim “by present[ing] the state courts only with the facts necessary
to state a claim of relief.”56 General appeals to broad constitutional principles
are insufficient to establish fair presentation for exhaustion purposes.57
These decisions are supported by well-established principles of
comity between the state and federal governments.58 The Supreme Court has
a strong aversion to original consideration of federal claims that were not
made clearly apparent to the state courts, which are equally as capable of
reviewing and resolving both federal and state-law issues.59 “The premise of
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do no sit as self-directed boards
of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions
presented and argued by the parties before them.”60 Fair presentation protects
our country’s adversarial system, promotes established principles of comity,
and enhances administration of justice in the state appellate courts.61
B. Procedural Default
The procedural-default doctrine is ancillary to the exhaustion
requirement.62 A “procedural default” is a distinct and separate sanction for
failing to fully exhaust remedies, and is therefore given a separate

53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004);
Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2009).
54. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995).
55. Id. at 366.
56. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996).
57. Id. at 162.
58. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000).
59. Id.
60. United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1366 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Carducci v. Regan, 741 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
61. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 452.
62. Edwards, 529 U.S. at 452-53.
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denomination as it has its own administrative procedures.63 If a state court
was never fully and fairly presented a federal claim, and a state-court remedy
is no longer available, commonly because of statutes of limitations on
appeals, the claim is technically exhausted but procedurally barred.64
Additionally, if a constitutional claim is presented to federal courts resting
on one theory, but was presented to a state court resting on a separate theory,
the claim is procedurally defaulted.65 Further, “reconsideration of [a] federal
issue on federal habeas [is curtailed] as long as the state court explicitly
invokes a state procedural bar rule as a . . . basis for decision.”66 As an
illustration, in Harris v. Reed, a waiver supplied an adequate and independent
state-law ground to bar federal habeas review, notwithstanding a petitioner
demonstrating cause and prejudice.67 A claim that has been procedurally
defaulted is barred from federal review, unless a petitioner can satisfy the
Sykes “cause and prejudice” standard to excuse the default.68
Just as the doctrine of exhaustion has roots respecting comity, the
purpose of the procedural default doctrine serves the notions of finality and
federalism.69 “[T]he federal courts will not disturb state court judgments
based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.”70 Sykes
allows for “cause” to lie and excuse a procedural default, even when a state
procedural ground bars the claim in federal court. What constitutes “cause”
under the Sykes standard has been the subject of a series of cases, including
Coleman, Martinez, and Davila.
III. A TRILOGY OF CASES MOLDING THE WAYS THAT A CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL MAY SERVE AS “CAUSE” FOR
ANOTHER PROCEDURALLY DEFAULTED CLAIM.
A. Coleman v. Thompson
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, coined Coleman as a case
concerning federalism, about “the respect that federal courts owe to the States
and the States’ procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners
in federal habeas corpus.”71 A Virginia County court convicted Roger Keith
Coleman of rape and capital murder.72 The trial court sentenced Coleman to
63. 20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973).
64. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 752-53 (1991).
65. Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1998) (ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was procedurally defaulted when petitioner’s argument in state courts relied
upon different grounds than argument on habeas appeal).
66. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 (1989).
67. Id.
68. 20 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (Originally published in 1973).
69. Id.
70. Id. citing Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
71. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727 (1991).
72. Id.

2018]

THE GAP BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA

205

death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.73 In his state habeas claim,
Coleman raised several constitutional claims, not raised before on direct
appeal, all of which failed.74 Eventually, Coleman filed for appeal of his state
habeas claim to the Virginia Supreme Court.75 The parties filed briefs
addressing the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss for his untimely filing of
appeal, as well as the merits of the claims; the Virginia Supreme Court
ultimately dismissed Coleman’s appeal.76
Coleman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, presenting four
federal constitutional claims, all of which he previously raised on direct
appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, as well as seven additional claims that
were raised in the first instance in his state habeas claim.77 The District Court
held that “by virtue of the dismissal of his appeal by the Virginia Supreme
Court in state habeas, Coleman had procedurally defaulted the seven
claims.”78 Nonetheless, the District Court addressed the merits of all eleven
claims, and denied petition.79 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed.80 The Fourth Circuit held that Coleman’s seven
claims that were presented for the first time in his state habeas proceeding
were all procedurally defaulted because of the failure for timely filing of the
appeal.81 However, Coleman argued that the Virginia Supreme Court did not
specify whether their dismissal was based on a procedural default, and
therefore it should not be treated as such without clear indication.82 The
Fourth Circuit disagreed, and held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision was based “on independent and adequate state grounds and that
Coleman had not shown cause to excuse the default.”83 Therefore, Coleman’s
claims presented only in his state habeas proceeding were held procedurally
barred.84
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
relationship between state procedural defaults and federal habeas review. The
Court held that a state prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed
if the prisoner has not exhausted all available state remedies as to any of his
federal claims.85 The exhaustion requirement is grounded in principles of
comity, where “the States should have the first opportunity to address and

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 731.
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correct alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.”86 So when a
prisoner or a habeas petitioner fails to exhaust all State procedural
requirements for presenting his federal claims, he has denied the state court
the first opportunity to address those claims and provide an independent and
adequate state ground to support the judgment.87 Without applying the
independent and adequate state ground doctrine in habeas proceedings,
petitioners would attempt to avoid exhaustion by defaulting their federal
claims in state court.88 Applying the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine gives the states a shot at correcting mistakes in all federal habeas
cases.89
In his petition, Coleman stated that there was in fact cause for his
default caused by the untimely filing of his state habeas appeal.90 Coleman
claimed that the late filing was the result of attorney error on the part of his
post-conviction counsel, and that this should have excused the procedural
default in his federal habeas proceeding.91 Essentially, Coleman was putting
before the Court, the idea that ineffective counsel’s failure to timely raise his
claims should serve as “cause” within the Sykes standard to excuse the
underlying procedural default of those seven claims brought initially in his
state habeas appeal.
Until this case, the Court provided only the narrowest of exceptions
to excuse a default based on attorney error.92 “So long as a defendant is
represented by counsel, whose performance is not constitutionally
ineffective, under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, we
discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that
results in a procedural default.”93 The Court further noted that there is no
constitutional right to counsel in a state post-conviction proceeding;
therefore, the error cannot be constitutionally ineffective, and cannot serve
as “cause” needed to excuse a procedural default.94 The Coleman Court held
that the existence of cause for a procedural default must turn on an objective
external factor that prevented their counsel from complying with a State’s
procedural rules, such as “interference by officials”, or “a showing that the
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.”95
But the Court clearly stated “[a]ttorney ignorance or inadvertence is not
‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing
to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 487).
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
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of attorney error.’”96 Thus, the Court effectively stated that Coleman’s
habeas attorney’s error could only serve as cause to excuse the procedural
default of his seven claims if that attorney’s error was due to external factors,
rather than plain attorney error.
The Court distinguished this by stating that if attorney error
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment would
require that error to constitute cause for a default.97 “[I]t is not the gravity of
the attorney’s error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of
petitioner’s right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external
factor.”98 Therefore, in a direct appeal proceeding, where counsel is
guaranteed by our Constitution, if a petitioner defaults a claim as the result
of ineffective assistance of counsel or attorney error, it is the State that is
responsible for bearing that cost of the resulting default, not the prisoner. 99
The Coleman Court found “a different allocation of costs” occurs in
proceedings where the State has no responsibility to ensure that counsel is
provided to a prisoner, such as post-conviction proceedings, and the prisoner
must bear the cost in that instance.100 In such cases where no right to counsel
is guaranteed, such as Coleman’s state habeas proceeding, the Court
effectively held that ineffective counsel could not serve as “cause” to excuse
a procedural default, absent a clear violation of a petitioner’s constitutional
rights.
However, the unique structure of Virginia’s appeals process gave the
Court pause to consider another aspect of when a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel could be brought. Coleman’s claims that were brought
in his state habeas proceeding included ineffective assistance of counsel
during trial, sentencing, and appeal.101 Coleman asserted that these claims
must constitute cause, because under Virginia law ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, related to counsel’s conduct during trial or appeal, could only
be brought in a state habeas proceeding.102 He argued that his state habeas
attorney’s error in failing to timely file his claims in his state habeas
proceeding, the first forum in which his claims could be raised, justified
cause.103
In response, the Court reiterated, “Counsel’s ineffectiveness will
constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation.”104 There
is no right to counsel in a state post-conviction or collateral proceeding, and
one state court has already addressed Coleman’s claims: the state habeas trial

96. Id.
97. Id. at 754.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 756.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 755.
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court.105 Further, the Court answered the question of whether Coleman had a
constitutional right to counsel on appeal from a state habeas trial court
judgment in the negative.106 Because Coleman, just as any other criminal
defendant, had no right to counsel beyond his first appeal, he could not be
said to have a right to counsel in appealing a state collateral determination of
his claims of trial error.107 Without a right to counsel in his state habeas
proceeding, the Coleman Court proclaimed any attorney error resulting in a
default of his claims cannot constitute cause to excuse a default in federal
habeas.108
Essentially, the Coleman Court determined his state habeas
counsel’s error was not a violation of a constitutional right and, therefore,
could not serve as cause to overcome the procedurally defaulted claims.
Because the error by the attorney was not a violation of Coleman’s
constitutional rights and was instead a late filing error, the ineffectiveness of
counsel was not severe enough to serve as “cause” under the Sykes standard.
Without “cause” to overcome the procedural default, Coleman’s claims of
ineffective assistance of trial and appeal counsel could not be heard.
B. Martinez v. Ryan
The harsh result in Coleman was later visited again in Martinez v.
Ryan when a new state procedural wrinkle was introduced to the Court. In
Martinez v. Ryan, the United States Supreme Court announced a narrow
exception to their decision from Coleman; ineffective assistance by a
prisoner’s state post-conviction counsel may serve as cause to overcome a
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, where
the State requires a defendant to bring that claim in state post-conviction
proceedings, rather than on direct appeal, in the first instance.109
This precise scenario occurred in Martinez and drove the Court to
create a narrow exception to ensure that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, where it is constitutionally guaranteed, have their chance to be
heard. The state of Arizona does not allow a prisoner to bring claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct review.110 Instead, the prisoner
must bring those claims in a state collateral proceeding in the first instance.111
In Martinez, petitioner’s post-conviction counsel did not raise the claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and even stated that she “found no
meritorious claims helpful to petitioner.”112 During his federal habeas review,
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 756-57.
108. Id. at 757.
109. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413
(2013).
110. Id. at 1313.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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petitioner sought to bring his claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and
state post-conviction counsel.113 Petitioner asserted that because the state
post-conviction proceeding was the first place to challenge his conviction on
the grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he had a constitutional
right to an effective attorney in those post-conviction proceedings.114
Essentially, petitioner asked, “whether a federal habeas court may excuse a
procedural default of an ineffective-assistance claim, when the claim was not
properly presented in state court due to an attorney’s errors in an initialreview collateral proceeding.”115 Martinez hoped that the Court would
consider his procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, with his ineffective state habeas counsel’s actions serving as the
necessary cause.
Martinez was convicted of two counts of sexual conduct with a
minor.116 On appeal, Martinez was assigned new counsel, who brought
several claims on his behalf.117 However, pursuant to Arizona state law, his
appellate counsel was unable to bring claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal.118 After his appellate counsel initiated a postconviction claim for Martinez, counsel made no claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective.119 Further, the state trial court allowed Martinez forty-five
days in which to bring a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.120
However, Martinez failed to bring such a claim because he was unaware that
his appellate counsel had initially filed collateral proceedings at all.121
Martinez was essentially unaware that his case continued any further than his
original appeal, because counsel had failed to inform Martinez of the postconviction filings. The state trial court therefore dismissed his action for postconviction relief, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and
the Arizona Supreme court denied review.122
Represented by new counsel, Martinez attempted to file a second
notice of post-conviction relief with an Arizona trial court, alleging his trial
counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecution’s
evidence.123 Essentially, Martinez attempted to do what his initial postconviction counsel failed to do, timely file his claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. The court dismissed his petition, relying on an Arizona rule
barring relief on a claim that could have been raised in a previous collateral

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1314.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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proceeding.124 The Arizona trial court stated that Martinez should have
brought these claims in his first post-conviction proceeding and, therefore,
denied relief.125 The Arizona Supreme Court declined review.126
Finally, Martinez sought relief by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus with the United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
raising his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.127 While he
acknowledged that his claims were barred under state procedural rules of
defaults, Martinez argued that he had cause to overcome such default.128
Martinez claimed that “[h]is first post-conviction counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise any claims in the first notice of post-conviction relief and in
failing to notify Martinez of her actions.”129 The District court denied the
petition, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed relying on
Coleman; “absent a right to counsel in a collateral proceeding, an attorney’s
errors in the proceeding do not establish cause for a procedural default.”130
As noted above, the Coleman Court required a claim of ineffective counsel
to rise to the level of constitutional violation before it may serve as cause to
excuse a procedural default. The Coleman Court held that when counsel is
not constitutionally guaranteed, ineffectiveness of such counsel necessarily
could not violate one’s constitutional rights. The United States Supreme
Court granted cert to determine whether there was an exception reserved for
“those cases ‘where “state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can
present a challenge to his conviction.”‘”131
The Martinez Court stated that the Coleman Court suggested, “the
Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral
proceedings because ‘in [these] cases . . . state collateral review is the first
place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.’”132 These cases,
where a prisoner is required to bring claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in the first instance in a collateral proceeding, are their “one
and only appeal” of such claims.133 The Martinez Court refused to decide
whether this exception exists as a constitutional matter, and instead narrowed
the question to “whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral
proceeding on a claim of ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for
a procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding.”134 The Martinez Court
ultimately provided that a narrow exception to Coleman must exist where
“[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1314-15.
130. Id. at 1315.
131. Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755 (1991)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial.”135
The Martinez Court began by recognizing that the rule created by the
Coleman Court did not present the occasion to apply this exact principle, to
a case where attorney errors in initial-review collateral proceedings may
qualify as cause for procedural default.136 Several distinguishing factors
between the two cases make this apparent. Coleman alleged a failure of
counsel on appeal from an initial-review collateral proceeding, while
Martinez alleged failure of counsel on initial-review.137 Additionally,
Coleman’s claims had been addressed by the state habeas court, while
Arizona law mandated Martinez’s claims be brought in an initial-review
collateral proceeding in the first instance.138 “When an attorney errs in initialreview collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will
hear the prisoner’s claim.”139 Further, without counsel’s error in an initialreview collateral proceeding being able to serve as cause to excuse a
procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will ever review
petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, where counsel is
constitutionally guaranteed.140
The Martinez Court recognized that this does not apply to all postconviction proceedings; only those where the initial-review collateral
proceeding is the first designated proceeding where a prisoner can raise a
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.141 In these instances, such collateral
proceeding is functioning as a prisoner’s direct appeal of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.142 If a prisoner is denied counsel on direct
appeal, they have been denied fair process and the opportunity to adjudicate
the merits of his claims.143 The Martinez Court held that the same logic
applies in cases where ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims must be
brought in initial-review collateral proceedings.144 Without counsel, a
prisoner would be ill equipped to perform the necessary investigative work,
unversed with trial strategy, unfamiliar with applicable law or procedural
rules.145 “While confined in prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop
the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns
on evidence outside the trial record.”146

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1316.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1316-17.
142. Id. at 1317.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The Martinez Court emphasized the importance of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims and the requirement that effective counsel
be provided in order for a petitioner to effectively bring such claims.
Recognizing that a prisoner’s right to trial counsel is a foundational
requirement of the adversary system to ensure the prosecution’s case is
properly tested, the Martinez Court noted that an initial-review collateral
proceeding undertaken without counsel, or with ineffective counsel, may not
properly ensure that sufficient consideration is given to a potentially
substantial claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.147 Therefore,
when a state’s procedural rules mandate that a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel claim be brought up, in the first instance, in a post-conviction
setting, ineffective or absent counsel in the post-conviction setting may now
serve as the “cause” necessary to overcome a procedural default of those
original claims of ineffectiveness in a federal habeas case.148
C. Davila v. Davis
In Davila v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether the
particular exception presented in Martinez should also be extended to a
defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and ultimately
declined to extend.149 Recognizing that an extension of “cause” was given to
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Court now reached the
question of whether a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
brings about the same constitutional concerns that drove the Court to excuse
a procedural default based on post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to
initially bring such claim.
The jury in Davila convicted the Petitioner of capital murder and
sentenced him to death.150 Despite objections by petitioner’s trial counsel, the
trial court instructed the jury on transferred intent after the jury requested
clarification.151 On appeal, petitioner’s appellate counsel did not challenge
the instruction on transferred intent, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the conviction and sentence.152 The Petitioner sought habeas relief
in Texas state court, where his state habeas counsel did not challenge the jury
instruction or the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the issue on direct
appeal.153 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief.154
Petitioner sought federal habeas relief in Federal District Court,
arguing that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

147. Id. at 1318.
148. Id.
149. Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2063 (2017).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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to challenge the jury instruction.155 Invoking both Martinez and Trevino,
Petitioner argued that his state habeas counsel’s ineffectiveness provides
cause to excuse the procedural default on his claim of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel.156 The District Court denied the petition concluding that
Martinez and Trevino do not apply to excuse the procedural default of
Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.157 The
Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to reverse the
Fifth Circuit, seeking to extend Martinez and Trevino to his claim.158 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and denied such an extension of the
rule established in Martinez.159
The Davila Court rejected an expansion of Martinez because to do
so would “replace the rule of Coleman with the exception of Martinez.”160
Coleman provided that attorney error committed in the course of state postconviction proceedings, where the constitution does not guarantee the right
to counsel, cannot supply cause to excuse a procedural default that occurs in
those proceedings.161 Martinez qualified, rather than replaced, Coleman by
creating an equitable exception to procedurally defaulted claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel only when a state mandates that those
claims be raised in the first instance in an initial-review collateral proceeding
rather than on direct appeal.162
The Constitution guarantees the right to a criminal trial, but does not
guarantee the right to an appeal at all.163 The Martinez court was primarily
concerned with a defendant’s ability to have trial errors reviewed to reflect
the importance of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial
counsel.164 The Davila Court emphasized that a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel does not equate to trial error, and therefore
found that ineffective appellate counsel does not raise the same constitutional
concerns as were found in Martinez.165
The Martinez Court, by recognizing this narrow exception to provide
for cause when a state explicitly or implicitly requires claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel be brought during initial-review collateral
proceedings, made an equitable decision in light of the unique importance of
protecting trial rights.166 This exception was intended to be a narrow one,

155. Id.
156. Id. at 2063-64.
157. Id. at 2064.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2066.
161. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.
162. Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2065.
163. Id. at 2066.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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reflecting the importance of such trial rights specifically.167 By refusing to
expand the Martinez exception, the Davila Court proclaimed that it does
nothing more than respect that intention.168
The Petitioner in Davila then argued that his claim for ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel might never be reviewed if the rule in
Coleman were not expanded to fit his case.169 The Davila Court rejected this
argument stating that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not a trial
error, therefore the constitutional concerns in Martinez regarding a
defendant’s chance to have a trial error reviewed do not apply.170 While these
claims may be viable, and brought before a court, the Davila Court held that
such a claim does not carry the same constitutional weight as a trial error and
therefore does not necessarily require review as a violation of a constitutional
right would.171
The chief concern the Martinez Court addressed by creating the
narrow exception, was that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
a trial error, would escape review if the State required that defendant’s wait
to bring the claim, in the first instance, in post-conviction proceedings.172
Typically, the first time a trial error could be reviewed is on direct appeal,
except when a state court mandates it be brought first in the post-conviction
proceedings.173 If post-conviction counsel fails to raise the claim when it is
first available to be raised, the claim will completely evade state review. 174
Additionally, “because attorney error in a state post-conviction proceeding
does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default under Coleman, no
federal court could consider the claim either.”175 Essentially, by eliminating
the typical first chance review on initial appeal, and mandating review on
post-conviction appeal, a state is moving a constitutionally guaranteed appeal
outside of the arena where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. Further,
because a state has moved review to a stage in litigation where counsel is not
constitutionally guaranteed, and the Coleman Court held that attorney error
in such settings does not qualify to serve as “cause” to excuse a procedural
default, without the exception from Martinez, these claims of ineffective trial
counsel have the potential of falling through the crack of review. The
Martinez court recognized the danger of a constitutional right evading
review, and created this narrow exception to provide for trial error review in
the narrowest of circumstances.176

167. Id. 2066-67.
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The Davila Court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel does not pose the same risk of evading review as a trial
error does.177 The Court reasoned that a claim of ineffective appellate counsel
based on a preserved trial error means that at least one court, the trial court,
has considered the claim on the merits, even though appellate counsel failed
to raise it again.178 If trial counsel failed to preserve an error, the Davila Court
held that Petitioner’s proposed extension of the rule would still not
necessarily give access to federal review of that error either.179 To be
effective, appellate counsel is only required to raise arguments most likely to
succeed on appeal.180 Even if the trial error is unpreserved, that error will not
necessarily be plainly stronger than those errors that were preserved, thus
appellate counsel is not required to bring every non-frivolous claim to be
effective.181 Essentially, the Court stated it is unlikely a defendant could
make a substantial claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
because in most instances where the trial court did not rule on a preserved
error, appellate counsel is not required to raise every argument to be
considered effective.182 Finally, if a trial error goes unpreserved and was so
obvious that appellate counsel is constitutionally required to raise it on
appeal, it is likely the trial counsel’s ineffective assistance caused the error,
and the defendant could then invoke Martinez or Coleman instead.183
Further, the Davila Court found the equitable considerations from
Martinez to be inapplicable in the present case.184 In Martinez, the State
purposefully moved trial counsel ineffectiveness claims outside of the directappeal process, where the constitution requires counsel, and into the realm of
post-conviction proceedings where the constitution does not guarantee
counsel.185 The Martinez court held that it would be inequitable for courts to
refuse to hear claims of ineffective trial counsel when defendants are
procedurally mandated to bring them first in a proceeding where counsel is
not guaranteed to assist in raising it.186
In contrast, the Davila Court reasoned that claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, by nature, could not be presented until after
the end of the direct appeal.187 “Put another way, they necessarily must be
heard in collateral proceedings, where counsel is not constitutionally
guaranteed.”188 The fact that these claims are heard in proceedings where
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2068.
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counsel is not constitutionally required is an inherent function of the claim,
and not a choice of the State; therefore, the Court found that the same
equitable concerns from Martinez are inapplicable.189
IV. THE INADVERTENT GAP CREATED BETWEEN MARTINEZ AND DAVILA,
REQUIRING A SLIGHT EXTENSION OF MARTINEZ
The majority opinion’s decision to decline to extend the Martinez
exception to all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may prove too
broad and prevent genuine trial errors from receiving review, therefore
denying a prisoner of his constitutional right to a fair trial. There appears to
be a gap between the rules of Martinez and Davila, where a small number of
cases will fit, and require an extension of Martinez to claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. These are the cases where a claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not rely on an underlying trial
counsel error, and both appellate and post-conviction counsel’s error in
failing to raise results in a violation of a petitioner’s constitutional right to a
fair trial. Further, these are the claims that were not available for a trial court
to hear, and now face the potential of never being heard if both appellate
counsel, and post-conviction counsel, fails to raise it. These upcoming cases
likely to reach the Court should, in keeping with the historic spirit of the writ
to protect from unconstitutional confinement and the use of the “cause and
prejudice” standard, be granted a Martinez extension to close the gap
between Davila, to ensure all trial errors are properly heard.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer believed the Davila Court
missed the point when it said that at least one court will have considered the
underlying legal error.190 Breyer’s illustrative dissent points toward this gap
of cases that are not provided for between Martinez and Davila. Breyer views
the defendant’s complaint in Davila as regarding the ineffectiveness of his
appellate counsel, not about the underlying trial error.191 He writes that
claims of ineffectiveness, likely based on failure to appeal a trial court’s
erroneous decision, do not help the defendant correct the trial court’s
errors.192 Those errors form the basis of the ineffectiveness claim, but the
main claim is still the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel’s failure to raise
such appeals.193 Justice Breyer deems that without extending the exception
from Martinez, a court will never review the ineffectiveness of their appellate
counsel.194
The more intriguing point brought out by Justice Breyer’s dissent
deals with claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where no
189. Id.
190. Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2073 (J. Breyer dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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error was committed by trial counsel at all. Essentially, the Davila Court’s
holding created a gap by inadvertently overlooking claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel that do not rely on an underlying claim of
ineffective trial counsel. When an error in trial occurs, but does not rest on
an error committed by trial counsel, appellate counsel must bring it in the
first instance on direct appeal. It is these claims of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, that do not rest on a trial attorney’s error, that simply arose
through trial, which appellate counsel should have brought up to be heard
initially on direct appeal, but for some reason failed to do so rendering
counsel ineffective. The gap is not created by claims that appellate counsel
made a small error, where it is not of a constitutional magnitude, for example
by failing to raise a fact that trial counsel did not properly raise; the gap is
found where appellate counsel makes a constitutional error in failing to bring
up a severe trial error that should have been reviewed at least once before
post-conviction proceedings, and could have only been reviewed in the first
instance on direct appeal.
The concern focuses on those errors which amount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. The majority in Davila was correct
to reject those claims of ineffective appellate counsel that merely rely on
error committed by trial counsel, as those ultimately were either heard by the
trial court when preserved, or do not amount to a constitutional violation of
the right to counsel when appellate counsel chooses not to raise them. The
majority also correctly focused on the need to reserve the Martinez exception
for significant trial concerns to protect a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.
However, when those two concerns merge, appellate counsel’s error
amounting to a violation of a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial, then an
extension of Martinez to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
becomes not only appropriate, but necessary.
Justice Breyer, illustrates that there will be some cases where no
underlying trial error serves as the basis for appellate counsel’s
ineffectiveness.195 “Supposed that, during the pendency of the appeal,
appellate counsel learns of a Brady violation, juror misconduct, judicial bias,
or some similar violation whose basis was not known during the trial.”196 If
appellate counsel fails to pursue such claims, that ineffectiveness now serves
as the basis for the claim, and without the Martinez exception extension, no
court will hear this appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim.197 No error by
trial counsel here serves as the basis for appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness,
however these are trial errors that amount to a constitutionally unfair trial.
Justice Breyer’s dissent helpfully provides a vivid example, which
he believes demonstrates a case where an extension of Martinez to claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is required:

195. Id.
196. Id.
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Now suppose that a prisoner claims that the trial court made
an important error of law, say, improperly instructing the
jury, or that the prosecution engaged in misconduct. He
believes his lawyer on direct appeal should have raised those
errors because they led to his conviction or (as here) a death
sentence. The appellate lawyer’s failure to do so, the
prisoner might claim, amounts to ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The prisoner cannot make this argument
on direct appeal, for the direct appeal is the very proceeding
in which he is represented by the lawyer he says was
ineffective. Next suppose the prisoner fails to raise his
appellate lawyer’s ineffectiveness at the initial state habeas
proceeding, either because he was not represented by
counsel in that proceeding or because his counsel there also
was ineffective. When he brings his case to the federal
habeas court, the State contends that the prisoner’s failure to
present his claim during the initial state habeas proceeding
constitutes a procedural default that precludes federal review
of his claim.198
Based on this example, Justice Breyer pointed out that a prisoner in
this circumstance could not be treated any differently than one whose claim
falls within the Martinez exception because the end result either way is a
constitutional claim completely evading review.199
Another illustrative example of a case falling between Martinez and
Davila would include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
for a failure to raise a claim of a Brady violation. In Brady v. Maryland, the
United States Supreme Court held that suppression of requested evidence,
favorable to an accused, by the prosecution violates due process.200
Therefore, if a Brady violation by the prosecution is discovered post trial, it
becomes the duty of appellate counsel to raise this violation of trial rights in
the first instance on direct appeal. If appellate counsel is ineffective for
failing to raise this issue, then a significant due process right, which has been
covered under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, has been violated.
This clearly demonstrates the cases where the two concerns of Martinez
converge; an error from appellate counsel, not relying on trial counsel error,
results in a constitutionally unfair trial.
Further, if a prisoner’s post-conviction counsel is then additionally
ineffective for failing to raise appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, according
to the majority opinion in Davila, this claim is procedurally barred in a
federal habeas court. This claim evades review on direct appeal, the initial
198. Id. at 2071-72.
199. Id. at 2072.
200. 158 A.L.R. Fed. 401 (Originally published in 1999).
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chance to be raised, because only appellate counsel was ineffective for a
failure to raise. Then, because Coleman tells us that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel cannot serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of
the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this claim may not be
raised on federal habeas corpus, and thus receives no review at all.
In this scenario, a significant trial error affecting the prisoner’s
constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective counsel on direct appeal, will
completely evade review of any court. This is completely inconsistent with
the aspirations of Martinez, that significant trial errors be heard by at least
one court, and that ineffective post-conviction counsel may occasionally
serve as cause to excuse those procedural defaults of constitutionally sound
trial error claims.
A claim, such as a Brady violation, that might only be brought on
direct appeal is procedurally identical to a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel that is mandated to be brought in post-conviction proceedings
in the first instance. In both instances we have claims that are initially brought
up in their initial trial or direct proceedings, and then have a single chance to
be heard by a court on appeal in a post-conviction proceeding. If trial counsel
is ineffective for any reason, or if appellate counsel is ineffective for failing
to raise a legal issue, such as a Brady violation from trial, it is necessary for
post-conviction counsel to bring such ineffectiveness claims in the first
instance. If a failure on post-conviction counsel’s part to bring such claims
of ineffectiveness arises, without the exception in Martinez allowing such
post-conviction ineffectiveness to serve as cause, there are now two claims
resting solely on a legal error in trial that will completely evade review; one
based on trial counsel’s error, and one based on a trial error that appellate
counsel was constitutionally obligated to raise. These errors infringe on a
prisoner’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and the right to effective trial
counsel, which has been coined by the Coleman, Martinez, and Davila Courts
as bedrock of our adversarial trial system.
An extension of Martinez to include this narrow class of claims is
the best solution in closing the gap of cases between Martinez and Davila.
The Davila Court properly draws the line against extending the exception to
ineffective appellate counsel claims that are based on trial counsel errors.
However, there will soon be a case where no such trial counsel error exists,
and appellate counsel’s error constitutionally affects a petitioner’s right to a
fair trial. It is this small class of cases, where the constitutional concerns of a
fair trial that led to the Martinez exception initially, will be properly served
by allowing post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness to serve as “cause” in
order to have a significant trial error be heard by a court and corrected.
Not creating this exception will lead to claims of ineffective
appellate counsel being ignored or forgotten by post-conviction counsel, and
thus giving no reprieve on petition for federal habeas corpus because of its
procedural labels. Just because appellate counsel initially committed the
error, and then post-conviction counsel failed to raise that ineffectiveness,
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this should not prevent the claim from going unheard. The focus should not
be on the type of counsel who was ineffective. The focus should be on the
underlying claim, as the Davila Court focused on when rejecting the
extension to claims where appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness relied on a trial
counsel as the underlying basis. The Court determined that a simple trial
error, based on trial counsel’s error, already had an opportunity for review
and could not be heard again. The underlying claim in these situations is trial
counsel’s error and appellate counsel’s error in not raising trial counsel’s
error.
However, the underlying claims in these next cases of ineffective
appellate counsel will not rely on any action or error of trial counsel. These
claims will rely on constitutional errors in trial, where appellate counsel had
the initial chance to raise the claim and was ineffective for failing to do so.
Just as the Martinez Court allowed post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness
to serve as cause when the underlying claim affected a constitutional right to
counsel and fair trial, so too will an extension to those constitutional claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This will properly close the gap
between the two cases, balancing those underlying claims that are
constitutionally grounded and those that are not. The notions of federalism
and comity are properly served by allowing states the first chance review, but
not closing federal court doors to hearing significant constitutional trial
claims.
V. CLOSING THE GAP; THE SOLUTION MOST CONSISTENT WITH
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS HISTORY AND CURRENT CASE LAW.
In support of the conclusion that an extension of Martinez is
necessary to fill the gap of cases created by Davila, we come full circle back
to the origins and importance of the writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas
corpus gives a prisoner a chance to invoke the writ, come to court, and plead
their case of wrongful imprisonment. Over time, the writ has served many
purposes, and our Founding Fathers believed it was significant enough to
include within our country’s constitution. While serving the notions of
comity and federalism, federal habeas corpus has evolved in such a manner
to respect the state court’s rights to hear claims initially and attempt to
provide a remedy when available, before a federal court hears the claims.
This prevents a prisoner from bypassing the state courts and taking their
federal claims straight to a federal court initially. However, obvious
exceptions arose; the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default serve
such exceptions. One must exhaust all state appeal options and give the state
a fair first hearing of all claims. However, if no state remedial paths are
utilized, and a claim was never brought before a state court, the claim is
considered procedurally defaulted. The harsh realities of the procedural
default were quelled ultimately by the Sykes Court, instituting a “cause and
prejudice” standard, necessary for a petitioner to establish before a court may
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excuse a procedural default. The “cause and prejudice” standard ensures that
there was a justifiable reason why the claim was not brought before a court
prior to issuance of a petition of federal habeas corpus, and demonstrates that
there would be actual prejudice to the petitioner if the claim were wholly
evaded.
Agreeing upon what constitutes “cause”, the so called “fatal-prong”
of the Sykes standard lead to the development of many circumstances that are
significant enough to serve as cause. The most notable of these, for the
purposes of this note, is a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel. The trilogy of cases regarding when ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel may serve as “cause” for a procedural default highlights
exactly why a gap exists between Martinez and Davila, and just how it can
be resolved when these next generations of cases appears before the Court.
Coleman established the importance of federalism, the application of
federal habeas corpus, and puts a substantial limitation of a defendant’s
ability to raise arguments for the first time. The Coleman Court held that
when counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed such as in post-conviction
proceedings, then ineffectiveness of such counsel necessarily does not
amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Without a violation of such
constitutional magnitude, “cause” cannot lie to excuse a procedural default.
Next, along came Martinez, recognizing that certain state procedural
structures constitutionally require a narrow exception to Coleman. In cases
where a state requires that claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel be
brought, in the first instance, in post-conviction proceedings, then a claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must serve as “cause” to
excuse the procedural default of the initial claim of ineffective trial counsel.
When post-conviction counsel is ineffective in failing to bring a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a court may never review a significant
trial error.
Several important pillars of federal habeas are served by the
Martinez decision. First, the Court held the constitutional guarantee of
effective trial counsel on the high pedestal it deserves, and recognized the
need to preserve such claims. The Martinez Court, by creating the exception
to Coleman, ensured that every prisoner would have the opportunity to have
trial errors reviewed, no matter the state’s mandated procedural structure.
Second, while Coleman holds that post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness
necessarily cannot serve as cause, the Martinez Court recognized that there
are times when such ineffectiveness rises to a level of constitutional violation
and must serve as cause. When post-conviction counsel fails to raise a claim
of ineffective trial counsel, a violation of a person’s constitutional right to
counsel during trial, then counsel’s failure to raise that claim is a
constitutional abuse as well.
Finally, the Davila Court distinguished the claims of ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and reserved the Martinez exception
only to claims for trial counsel. However, this broad categorization of trial
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counsel and appellate counsel ineffectiveness overlooks a gap between the
two types of errors. The focus of the Davila Court was upon which counsel
committed the initial error, and whether or not that counsel was
constitutionally guaranteed as the Coleman Court detailed. The Davila Court
made the correct decision when it comes to appellate counsels’ errors that
rely on a mistake made by trial counsel. A trial judge likely heard these
claims when trial counsel first raised them for preservation, or these are
claims such that appellate counsel is not obligated to raise again. Appellate
counsel need only raise those claims which are likely to succeed, or are
constitutionally obligated.
However, the Davila Court neglected to account for those
constitutional trial errors, occurring not because of trial counsel’s errors,
which necessarily must be brought in the first instance on direct appeal. The
Davila Court’s focus was too attached to the idea that appellate counsel
committed the error, and that appellate counsel is not guaranteed. The focus
must shift to the underlying claim that a petitioner wants tried; their
constitutional claims of trial error. These are the errors that occurred either
during or after trial, were not discovered until after trial, and significantly
harmed a petitioner’s right to a fair trial. The first opportunity to raise such
claims would be on direct appeal, and directly concern the trial itself. If
appellate counsel is ineffective for failing to raise these claims that they are
obligated to raise, the onus to raise an ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim is on post-conviction counsel. The responsibility to preserve a
person’s constitutionally guaranteed fair trial shifts onto post-conviction
counsel, and just as in Martinez, post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise
these claims would constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right
to a fair trial. As discussed in Coleman, and solidified in Martinez, the only
time post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness may serve as “cause” to
excuse a procedural default, is when that error rises to a constitutional
deprivation. These are the cases that require an extension of Martinez to fill
the gap.
Progressing through the historical evolution of the writ, the purposes
it is intended to serve, and the cases that have evolved over time to serve
exceptions not originally thought of lead us to this conclusion today. History
tells us that our Founding Fathers intended to allow courts to use the writ to
hear cases where a prisoner believes his confinement is unlawful. The
Congressional Act of 1867 ensured that federal and state prisoners alike
would have that opportunity. The doctrine of exhaustion ensures that
federalism is served by letting states have the first opportunity to hear and
cure a case. The doctrine of procedural default, and the Sykes “cause and
prejudice” standard ensured that even significant claims accidentally
overlooked would be heard. The Coleman Court ensured that “cause” only
meant those claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel that
were constitutionally egregious. The Martinez Court determined when those
claims became a constitutional concern, and held when post-conviction
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counsel’s ineffectiveness meant deprivation of review for a significant trial
error, cause must be available. And finally, Davila left a gap that now
requires filling. If we follow the path set by history and case law, the only
logical conclusion is that when post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness
threatens a significant constitutional guarantee of counsel or a fair trial, then
the “cause” prong must be satisfied. Martinez must be extended to ensure
that those trial errors appellate counsel fails to raise, which affect the
constitutionality of a fair trial, receive proper review when sought through a
petition of federal habeas corpus.

